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A B S T R A C T
Objective: Neurologists face a dilemma when communicating with their conversion disorder patients –
whether to be frank, and risk losing the patient’s trust, or to disclose less, in the hope of building a
therapeutic relationship. This study reports how neurologists in the UK described dealing with this
dilemma in their practice.
Methods: Practicing consultant neurologists from an NHS region were recruited by snowball sampling.
Twenty-two of 35 consultants in the region were interviewed in depth, and the interviews qualitatively
analysed.
Results: The neurologists were reluctant to disclose conversion disorder as a differential diagnosis until
they were certain. They were guided by the receptivity of their patients as to how psychological to make
their eventual explanations, but they did not discuss their suspicions about feigning. They described
their communications as much easier now than they had seen in training.
Conclusion: Neurologists adapt their disclosure to their patients, which facilitates communication, but
imposes some limits on truth-telling. In particular, it may sometimes result in a changed diagnosis.
Practice implications: An optimum strategy for communicating diagnoses will need to balance ethical
considerations with demonstrated therapeutic beneﬁt.
 2009 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Patient Education and Counseling
journa l homepage: www.e lsev ier .com/ locate /pateducou1. Introduction
Communicating medical information has become increasingly
recognised as a core medical skill and responsibility. Though
cultural differences remain, there has been a large shift in the
expectation of disclosure of even terminal diagnoses in the West
from the 1960s onwards [1]. This reﬂects a re-ordering of the
ethical obligations on doctors: the previous paternalist position –
protecting the patient from devastating news – has been
subordinated to respect for patient autonomy in the form of
‘truth-telling’ [2]. But difﬁculties with truth-telling remain, and
nowhere more prominently than in the ﬁeld of medically
unexplained symptoms. There, the principle of respect for
autonomy can be set against the principle of beneﬁcence [3],
since giving an unwelcome psychiatric diagnosis for a somatic
complaint may threaten the therapeutic alliance, with an angry
patient dropping out of the clinic and treatment [4].
The paradigmunexplained syndrome is hysteria, or ‘Conversion
Disorder’ as it is now known. Patients with conversion present* Corresponding author at: Department of Psychological Medicine, P062, Weston
Education Centre, Institute of Psychiatry, London SE5 9RJ, UK.
Tel.: +44 207 848 0158; fax: +44 207 848 5408.
E-mail address: r.kanaan@iop.kcl.ac.uk (R. Kanaan).
0738-3991/ 2009 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.
doi:10.1016/j.pec.2009.05.021with symptoms, such as paralysis, which appear at ﬁrst to be
neurological in origin but which on closer examination do not ﬁt
with known anatomy, physiology or neuropathology. Since the
time of Freud psychiatrists have tried to offer psychological
explanations for these symptoms (which remain ‘medically
unexplained’ however, because any such explanation is not
‘organic’ – i.e. not in terms of pathophysiology) and conversion
is now considered a psychiatric disorder [5]. But conversion is still
largely seen by neurologists, for whom it presents a ‘‘crisis’’ over
what to say [6]. Clear explanations are desperately sought by
patients [7], and are thought to be key to eventual recovery [8], but
any explanation seems fraught with risk. The neurologists tend to
endorse the view that the condition is psychiatric [6,9,10], but the
psychiatric models may seem outdated, not having advanced since
Freud [11], and may be equated with feigning by patients [12]. The
neurologist may also harbour suspicions that the patient is at least
in part pretending [6,10,13], a view they may be reluctant ever to
discuss [14].
The neurologist dealing with the conversion patient is thus
facedwith a dilemma: should they tell the patient what they think,
and risk an angry breakdown in their therapeutic relationship; or
should they offer something more acceptable to the patient,
avoiding discussion of psychiatry or deception, and so gradually
win them over to effective treatment [15]? Though the problem
has been raised, neurologists’ response to that dilemma has not
R. Kanaan et al. / Patient Education and Counseling 77 (2009) 296–301 297been reported. In this paper we examine their response – what
they say in theirmanagement interviewswith conversion patients,
the pressures they feel and the choices they make.
2. Methods
All practicing consultant neurologists in an NHS region were
approached, initially by email (a ‘consultant’ is the British term for a
doctor who has completed all specialist training). Further recruit-
ment proceeded by snowball sampling within the region until
thematic saturation was reached. After giving written informed
consent, the neurologists underwent depth interviews by the lead
author, at a time and place of the neurologist’s choosing – usually
either the neurologist’s ofﬁceor a designated interviewroom,but on
two occasions in the ofﬁce of the interviewer. The interviews lasted
from 35 to 70 min. The subject was ‘conversion disorder’, and no
deﬁnitionwas provided by the interviewer. The topic guide covered
theneurologist’s background, training, and currentpractice; it asked
for examples of memorable or current patients considered to have
conversion, before seeking their deﬁnitions, exclusions, models and
diagnostic practices, including the diagnostic interview and sub-
sequent communications. The guide provided a bare structure,
however, and the interviewer adapted the questions to the subject
and their previous answers. The topic guide was reviewed and
revised after piloting on the ﬁrst ﬁve subjects. Interviews were
audio-recorded, transcribed and analysed using NVIVO 7 software.
The lead author listened to the recordings and read the transcripts –
data collection and analysis proceeding concurrently. Transcripts
were coded by question, and, iteratively, by emerging themes,
consistent with a grounded theory approach [16]. Themes were
reviewedwith the other authors on an ongoing basis. The studywas
approved by the local Research Ethics Committee.
3. Results
3.1. Sample characteristics and background
Twenty-two neurologists were interviewed, from a potential
pool of 35 and three more agreed but no suitable time could be
arrangedwithin the studyperiod. Those interviewedranged from39
to 63 years of age, with a median of 45. Seven were female, 15 were
male. SeventeenwereCaucasian, twowere fromtheMiddleEast and
three from the Indian subcontinent. They had been medically
qualiﬁed for 14–39 years (median 20 years), receiving their medical
training in the UK (15 of them), other developed countries (5), and
the subcontinent (2). Fivehadworkedaspsychiatrists earlier in their
training (for from 6 weeks to 3 years), and eight had worked as
neurologists on a specialist neuropsychiatry service. Many had
exposure to conversion disorder, or a condition they considered
similar, prior to qualiﬁcation – seven had recognised it in family
members, one in a friend, and one in their younger self. In terms of
current work, all were attached to the regional neuroscience centre,
with most working in district general hospitals for the bulk of their
practice. Three held academic appointments, though all with
substantial clinical commitments. All were general neurologists,
except for one who saw only headache, one who worked only with
movement disorders and three who worked largely or exclusively
with epilepsy. All but ﬁve said they saw conversion commonly in
their work – up to 20% of their workload. One (who treated only
headache) reportednot seeing it at all, andwonderedwhether it still
existed. One reported seeing it less commonly than earlier in their
training, two felt that itwasnowuncommon, andone that itwas rare
to see it ‘‘in its severe form’’ (S06).
The neurologists described three ways in which they commu-
nicated with their patients about their diagnosis. Firstly, it was
discussed as part of ‘the differential diagnosis’ (the range ofdiagnostic possibilities being considered before a ﬁnal diagnosis
has been reached), as investigations proceeded; secondly, it was
discussed once a diagnosis was reached, in what we hereafter term
‘the management interview’; thirdly, and accompanying both of
the above, it was detailed in the letters the neurologist wouldwrite
to the referring doctor, butwhichwere copied to the patient. Aswe
shall see, different results were obtained for each type.
3.2. Discussing the differential diagnosis
Though neurologists reported being able predict a conversion
diagnosis from early on in the process, there was near-total
support for a thorough investigation in any case, raising the
question of whether and when to mention conversion in the
diagnostic process. On the one hand, introducing the idea of
conversion at an early stage was seen as a way of making it easier
to accept eventually, while on the other, neurologists were wary of
the reaction of their patients while there remained any question
over the diagnosis. So the neurologists described tailoring the
discussion to the receptivity of their patient:
. . . I usually bring up the issue of stress if I suspect it’s a factor
quite early on and I really see how they respond to that. If they
are absolutely adamant that’s not an issue then I will go through
the motion of just excluding the organic pathology. . . (S03)
I would generally try and [introduce the psychopathological] as
early as possible, usually at the ﬁrst time I meet them. But it
depends, really, how certain I am. Clearly if I am not certain that
it’s physical then I would say, ‘‘Well we need to do some tests
ﬁrst.’’ (S02)
There were thus two reported reasons for not discussing
conversion in the differential diagnosis – lack of receptivity, and
lack of certainty – which together served to minimise the risk of
unnecessary breakdown in the therapeutic relationship:
. . . I think if you say to a patient very early on ‘‘I think this is
psychiatric’’ . . . and then it turns out you are wrong. . . you may
have lost their trust and you may then ﬁnd it more difﬁcult to
manage that problem. . . (S16)
Though the need for certainty also served to minimise the risk
of what was seen as a peculiarly severe error in misdiagnosing the
neurological as psychiatric:
. . .the opprobrium cast on doctors who misdiagnose organic
symptoms as psychological is greater. . . from the patient, from
the relatives; your reputation, your colleagues. . . (S22)
. . .trying to tell someone there isn’t a physical cause when there
has been is quite hard . . .because we view psychological illness
differently to physical illness. If I told somebody that they had a
stroke and actually they had [multiple sclerosis] . . . I wouldn’t
feel that bad about it. . . (S21)
Consequently, some neurologists described a tendency to seek
out any neurological explanation, no matter how unlikely, even
when that ‘organic’ component might be only a small part of the
problem:
. . .myworry is obviously, as a neurologist and a clinician, not to
label patients with it who have a subtle underlying abnormality
that is elaborated. . . (S17)
That there might be some minor organicity underneath - that’s
why I investigate so thoroughly. (S22)
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desirable, but in practice limited by the receptivity of the patient,
and by the reluctance to raise the issue while there was any doubt.
This same ‘bespoke’ tailoring of the psychiatric diagnosis was
described in the eventual management interview.
3.3. The management interview
The neurologists described how once they were sufﬁciently
sure of the diagnosis they would have the ‘management interview’
with the patient to give their opinion. These would vary with how
receptive the patient was to psychological explanations:
. . .it depends on the patient. Some patients, maybe you could
explain to them that there is a non-organic basis. . . but the
majority of patients don’t like to be told that. . . (S07)
It depends on how I read them, and it varies from the absolutely
frank. . . the worst way . . .is kind of shruggingmy shoulders and
saying ‘‘crikey I don’t know what’s wrong with you. . .’’ (S17)
They detailed a wide range of models or metaphors, and would
also tailor these to their patients’ responses:
. . .you can use analogies of the sort of ‘mind forgetting how to
send the messages down’, and that ‘there’s some inhibition of
the areas of the brain involved with initiating movement’ . . .we
sort of get a feel from the patient about the type of language that
they comfortable about using and the type of . . .explanations
that they would ﬁnd palatable. (S06)
But the approach also varied by neurologist, with some
prepared to go far in exploring possible psychological explana-
tions, while others adopted a ‘merely unexplained’ model – that
they simply did not have an explanation. So, thoughmost reported
offering some kind of a psychological model:
I would say to them that sometimes we see this sort of problem
due to psychological issues which are often subconscious, you
are not aware that you are doing them. . . (S16)
I might say that it was a bit like a hypnotic trance, I might say
that the brain can alter lots of our conscious world uncon-
sciously. Sometimes I use the example of soldiers in the
battleﬁeld not feeling pain as an example of how the brain can
subconsciously modulate our sensory perception. (S02)
Others would avoid any mention of psychology or psychiatry:
. . .if I really thought it was a conversion . . .the ﬁrst thing I would
do is encourage lots of physiotherapy, lots of positive
reinforcement. . . ‘‘you will get better’’ . . .in the hope that they
may not get entrenched in that pattern. . . and sort of show them
that they can get out of it. (S05)
Even if pressed for an explanation:
I’d just admit complete ignorance . . . ‘in neurology, if 2,000
people come in the door, most don’t have anything physical but
they have very real complaints . . . every branch of medicine is
full of these symptoms, and our one in my patch is what you’ve
got’. (S04)
I’ll say that. . . neurology is not able to give all the answers for
everybody’s symptoms. What as neurologists we can do . . .is
test the system. . . but there comes a point . . . where we have to
say ‘‘well actually, we haven’t got the answer. . .’’ (S14)3.4. Putting it in writing
The consultants generally described their letters as following
the information given in the interviews closely. And for most the
letter was seen as helpful, even when the patient disagreed with
the diagnosis:
I might say something along the lines of, ‘‘I introduced the
possibility that the symptoms might have a psychological
cause, Mr Jones didn’t feel that was likely, but nonetheless I
think it’s worth pursuing this’’ . . .I wouldn’t exclude it simply
because the patient felt unhappy at that idea. (S01)
But for letters written in the early stages of the diagnostic
process, there was a common note of caution about the declaring
of information before the diagnosis was secure, a caution that had
to be balanced with the need for honesty, or accountability: the
neurologist had to be able to defend the letter, not offend or alarm
the patient, while still telling the patient’s general practitioner
what they suspected. Thiswasnot seen as aproblemaffecting only
this group – strikingly, some (S2, S12 and S17) compared
mentioning conversion in the differential diagnosis tomentioning
motor neuron disease (an incurable, degenerative disease, which
is usually fatal within a few years [17]). The balance was
reportedly often accomplished through the use of terms which
are, in a sense, codes: words which have a manifest meaning, for
the patient, and one that may have been spelled-out in the
interview, but which has a fuller, or slightly different, meaning for
the general practitioner:
I ﬁnd that my editing time is endless. . . because, not just for the
type of patient that you might be worried about but also, for
example, if you’ve seen somebody and you don’t know yet they
have motor neuron disease but it’s part of your differential
. . .you end up having to ﬁnd another word that implies it but
doesn’t say it; which they don’t understand but my medical
colleagues understand . . . a lot of people use the term
‘functional’. . . (S12)
. . .like most people, I would use certain codes – ‘elaborated
weakness’, ‘inconsistent’ and so on - and the patients will be
able to read that . . . but because I’ve had an open
conversation with them, I hope they know where I’m coming
from. (S18)
What is rather striking about such descriptions above is that the
consultant has apparently had a frank discussion with the patient,
is careful not to exceed what the interview contained (one
consultant described dictating their letters in front of their
patients), yet still wants, or expects the receiving doctor to read
something extra, something coded into their correspondence. This
may partly reﬂect the earlier stage of the diagnostic process – as
with motor-neurone disease, the consultant would not want the
patient to worry until absolutely necessary (so, subject 18, above,
was quite willing, once sure of the diagnosis, to give it to the
patient: . . .if it is a frank conversion disorder I’ll say, ‘‘I think this is a
conversion disorder’’). But the stage of the diagnostic process does
not entirely explain the coding since, for some, the coding was
present at every stage:
I’ll often say ‘‘it was difﬁcult to judge if there was weakness on
the left side’’. . . or ‘‘I was unable to comment aboutweakness on
the left side’’. . . which is my coded message . . . in a way I’m
saying, ‘‘Look . . .I can’t ﬁnd a problem with the wires. . . so we
need to explore other issues’’, but I’ll have talked that through
anyway. . . (S14)
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letter was understood as being ‘intercepted’ by the patient, rather
than being for the patient:
I don’t use the letter as a communication between myself and
the patient. It’s more a copy of a medical document that goes
betweenme and the GP . . . I try not to [omit things] because . . .I
want to be able to trace my train of thought. (S19)
I’ve got to say what I need to say in the letter. It’s primarily to
communicate with myself next time I see them and to
communicate with other physicians, and if I’m hampered in
doing that it’s to nobody’s interest. (S17)
So, though we have described a general picture of the
neurologists talking about the psychological, albeit with excep-
tions, and with caution, we are led to the question of what the
neurologists may think, but not say to the patient.
3.5. What they do not say
Since our interviews also covered the neurologists’ beliefs about
conversion, we can consider whether the neurologists’ reported
beliefs matched what they told their patients. And, in general, they
did – with some important provisos. The neurologists described
conversion as a severe, neurologically unexplained disorder for
which a psychological model might be available – albeit not
usually from them. But many of them did not make a clear
distinction between feigning and conversion [10]. And there were
gaps between their beliefs and the discussion of both psychological
models and feigning.
We have already reported how the neurologists described
adapting their discussion to the receptivity of the patient. This
resulted in weaker endorsement of the psychiatric in their
discussion with the patient than with their interviewer (whom
most will have known was a psychiatrist). But in some cases this
meant that the psychological was apparently not mentioned at all,
leaving the patient with the ‘merely unexplained’ or an unsub-
stantiated neurological diagnosis:
There’s another approach which is kind of complicity. You
know, I’ve got a few patients where I’ve never really confronted
or gone into what I think . . . (S16)
Other reasons for omission were also reported, such as serving
the greater good:
I was asked to review a lady with multiple sclerosis. . . she was
the hero of this and that andworked terribly hard for people. . . I
couldn’t ﬁnd a neurological sign. . . and I just went, ‘‘It’s very
nice to see you. I think you’re doing really well and I don’t think
there’s any need for me to see you again.’’ (S10)
Or the therapeutic efﬁcacy of avoidance:
. . . one makes sort of encouraging noises - a course of physio,
come back and see us . . . and if they’ve done well then you just
let sleeping dogs lie, I think. [Otherwise] it’s . . .opening a can of
worms really. . .: one, it may not be quite so serious; . . . two,
theremay not be a rightway to address some of the issues. (S03)
Though in most this was described as occasional, there were
some for whom it represented a more systematic avoidance of an
uncomfortable scenario:
I try and avoid it as much as possible and I try and get other
people to do it . . . so then obviously they can’t putquestions. . . which I wouldn’t necessarily know how to
answer. . . (S05)
In this context, the offering of second opinions was not
infrequently invoked: though it acknowledged the lack of
certainty, it could also serve to avoid making the diagnosis:
If it’s very difﬁcult Imight . . . offer them a second opinion . . . I do
that less and less . . . I began to realise I was actually copping out
of just confronting the situation. (S17)
The neurologists were divided on the role of feigning, usually
described as ‘malingering’. There were some who maintained a
clear division between feigning and conversion, but equally many
who saw the division as unclear, in a number of ways: some held
that the two could not be clinically distinguished, some that the
disorders were blurred together, and some who saw feigning as
being ubiquitous and hence not an exclusion criterion [18]. None of
the neurologists reported discussing feigning as part of a
differential diagnosis, however.
I may be having some private thoughts about the possibility of
factitious disorder, but . . .I don’t put that to patients. I don’t
have. . . a good way of saying, ‘‘As well as being epilepsy and
these other things, non-epileptic attack disorder, you could just
be making this up.’’ (S01)
Even in those rare cases where neurologists reported being
convinced that a patient was feigning it was very unlikely for them
to discuss this with the patient. One neurologist described
confrontation of a patient with Munchausen’s syndrome, but
other patients ‘caught’ in acts of feigning or conscious control of
their symptoms were more likely to be allowed to ‘slink off’ and
self-discharge. If discussed at all, feigning was so heavily coded as
to be almost indecipherable:
. . .if I think . . .there might be a more conscious process of the
whole thing taking place. . . I would put that in a very subtle
manner . . . ‘‘these symptoms are very rarely seen to co-exist
together; onewould therefore assume that theremight be some
other underlying features whichwemay not have identiﬁed. . .’’
(S20)
But the neurologists reported they usually ignored it, because it
was too much trouble:
. . .if I really thought they were putting it on . . . I would provide
them with the reassurance that I haven’t found anything and
then sort of write back to their GP and explain that rather than
trying to put them through the system. (S16)
Or too unpleasant:
. . .subconscious behaviour has nice connotations and conscious
behaviour has nasty connotations . . .it forces people therefore
to use - because they want to be nice to their patient - to use
inappropriate diagnostic labels . . .to talk about a ‘‘conversion’’
or ‘‘hysteria’’ when actually they’re malingering. (S22)
Or because they did not feel it was a medical issue:
It’s not your job to make any sort of value judgement. . . (S10)
3.6. Pressures in the interview
Many of the reported reasons for the gaps between preferred
and achieved communication have been alluded to above, but we
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desire for therapeutic effect and wish to avoid confrontation,
though these often coincided.
The neurologists expressed the view that delicacy was required
to obtain an optimal therapeutic effect, to allow the diagnosis to
unfold in a way that the patient could eventually accept, or to
accept a treatment they may otherwise reject. And they described
learning this both through their training and experience, but also
particularly the older doctors through seeing their teachers’
difﬁculties with a more challenging approach:
I saw too many of my senior colleagues. . . losing contact with
their patients by saying, ‘‘We can’t ﬁnd anything wrong with
you - goodbye’’ . . . it’s a fundamental failure of the role of the
physician. (S18)
. . .when Iwas training it used to be a stressful and difﬁcult thing
to do and now I don’t ﬁnd it . . . there was a sort of, ‘‘it’s real or it
isn’t real’’, and ‘‘you might be putting it on’’ and . . .that’s what
got the doctor and the patient annoyed. (S04)
On the other hand, the neurologists were frank about their more
personal motivations, of the chastening experiences of mistakes,
complaints and court cases, and, at a more mundane level, of the
desiretohavepleasantandrespectful relationships.For thoughmany
patients responded positively, the relationship could be jeopardised
by giving an unwelcome diagnosis to an unreceptive patient:
It’s variable really. Some people are very acceptant of it
. . .jumping up and down and very keen to see the psychia-
trist. . .some people say thank you very much and go out the
door and then don’t come back (S16)
It evokes various types of responses in people . . .some. . . get
quite angry. . . ‘‘are you saying it’s in my mind?’’ . . .another
. . .response is . . .‘‘so that means you don’t really know what’s
going on. . .’’ (S20)
. . .the two things, if I’m honest, are a dislike of conﬂict. . . and, I
guess, deep down, the desire that when somebody leaves the
room. . . they don’t hate me. (S18)
. . .it’s so unusual for us to have a patient who aggressively
disagrees. . . it’s very unusual . . .that you’re not on the same side
as them. . . (S06)
To that end, giving some patients a way out of their difﬁculties,
whatever the neurologist might believe about their aetiology,
could be both therapeutically effective, and also avoid conﬂict:
. . .if you suddenly come at them and sort of say ‘‘oh, stand up
you fool’’ . . .I don’t think you’re going to really beneﬁt that
patient or that patient’s family. Whereas if you can introduce
the concept of being subconscious. . . then I think you keep the
patient’s trust on board and they are more likely to go ahead
with you. (S16)
. . .sometimes you need to. . . to some extent play along, have a
face-saving formula and get out of it together. . . (S12)
4. Discussion and conclusion
4.1. Discussion
Facedwith an apparently stark dilemma– tell the truth and lose
the patient, or dissemble and help them – the neurologists weinterviewed described piloting a middle way. They described
seeking away of sayingwhat they believed,more or less, while still
helping the patient. If this were borne out it could be seen as a
success for the efforts that have gone into communication training
for clinicians. Tailoring the discussion, with an ear for the patient’s
view, is not only good communication, it is also good medical
practice (see, for example, the General Medical Council’s Guide-
lines [19]). And this group of neurologists described far less hostile
and far more therapeutic patient relationships than they saw in
their predecessors. However, there was also a cost to the approach
the neurologists described, in that at least some neurologists, with
some patients, were not saying quite what they believed. Most
neurologists strove to give the patients an acceptable psycholo-
gical model for their symptoms, but the pressure of adapting
would often mean that the psychological was minimised, and
would sometimesmean that the psychological and in almost every
case that feigning were not mentioned at all.
In considering whether this matters we must ask what the
neurologists are doing in their adaptation. In deferring the
differential diagnosis, the neurologist is being classically patern-
alist. They defer the discussion until they are certain, sparing the
patient (and themselves) an awkward, and hopefully unnecessary,
period of stress. Concern that the neurologists may be motivated
by the desire to avoid conﬂict can be largely set aside: avoiding
conﬂict can itself be seen as therapeutic, or at least as coinciding
with therapeutic goals, as a ‘double effect’ (as when giving a lethal
dose of morphine serves the double effect of analgesia). And
though it is perhaps surprising that a differential diagnosis of
conversion would be thought as difﬁcult to communicate as a
terminal illness, the handling of such illness does provide a clear
precedent for what the neurologists do here. As long as the patient
is eventually given the results, it can be argued that no harm has
been done [20]. The situation is consequently different in the
management interview, since the diagnosis by that stage is as clear
as it is ever likely to be. There, the question can be framed as ‘when
does adapting the message become collusion?’. The distinction is
likely to be a very ﬁne one, but one key criterion could be – if it
changes the diagnosis.
One difﬁculty with the ﬁeld of unexplained neurology is that
there are several competing diagnoses which neurologists ﬁnd
poorly demarcated from each other [10]. Nevertheless, if we
reduce the differential diagnosis to three – the physical unex-
plained (there is a medical explanation, but we simply have not
found it), the psychologically explained (conversion disorder), and
wilfully explained (feigning) – then diagnosing one of these three
may be understood to be excluding the other two. That is explicitly
the case with the psychiatric criteria [21,22], and ﬁnds some
support from neurologists [10]. In which case, by not pointing out
the wilful or the psychological, the neurologist may be changing
the diagnosis.
Though changing the diagnosis sounds serious in principle,
however, such is the state of research in this ﬁeld that we do not
knowwhether itmakes any difference in practice. The diagnoses are
seen as woefully inadequate [23], so that some have called for the
distinctions to be dropped [24], and, in any case, there is little
evidence for effective treatment of any of the three [25,26]. So,
should the neurologists do differently, and push their views harder
on resisting patients? The neurologists described many situations
when pressing frank views of feigning or of psychological
explanations had led to complaints or therapeutic breakdown,
suggesting that they had learned where to draw the line through
hard-won experience. Yet there is evidence from primary care, at
least, that much of the pressure for a somatic explanation does not
come from the patient [27]. And just because patients resist a
diagnosis does notmean theywould prefer not to be told it. Patients
in primary carewere awarewhen their doctors ‘colluded’ with their
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desire for full disclosure of diagnoses as diverse as Alzheimer’s and
cancer [1]: whether that is also true for patients with unexplained
neurologyhasyet tobedetermined,buta fair presumptionwouldbe
that patients want to know what their doctors believe.
4.2. Conclusion
Communicating the diagnosis of conversion disorder was seen
as potentially challenging by neurologists, who described adapting
their communication to their patients’ receptivity to psychological
thinking. This would sometimes emphasise therapeutics over the
disclosure of the neurologist’s opinion, minimising the role of
psychology and ignoring any suspicions about feigning. In some
cases it may have resulted in changed diagnoses.
4.3. Practice implications
Even where patients appear to disagree with a diagnosis, it
should not be presumed that they do not want to know what their
doctor thinks. The optimum strategy for communicating diagnoses
of unexplained neurology has yet to be empirically determined,
but it will need to balance ethical considerations with demon-
strated therapeutic beneﬁt.
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